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The conventional history of the rise of affirmative action in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s tends toward a too simple dialectic. The early creation and extension 
of affirmative action law is often described as an extension of the civil rights 
movement, whereas organized opposition to affirmative action is described as 
something that occurred later, as a backlash or reaction that did not fully take 
hold until Ronald Reagan was elected president in 1980.1
In this chapter, I tell a different story. I describe the role that labor union 
resistance to affirmative action played in limiting the ability of the federal gov-
ernment to enforce new civil rights laws well before the more overt backlash 
against affirmative action became ascendant in U.S. political culture in the 1980s 
and 1990s. There was no heyday for attempts by federal regulatory agencies to 
impose affirmative action on U.S. industry. There was no pristine origin against 
which a backlash could define itself, because enforcement of affirmative action 
had accommodated its opponents from the beginning.
Affirmative action law emerged out of and in response to civil rights move-
ment protests against the racism of federal construction contractors, whose 
discriminatory hiring policies were defended and often administered by the 
powerful building trades unions.2 But the resistance of those unions to the 1969 
Revised Philadelphia Plan—the first government-imposed affirmative action 
plan—severely curtailed the ability of the federal government to enforce affirma-
tive action in all industries. By undermining the capacity of the U.S. Department 
of Labor’s Office of Contract Compliance (OFCC) to enforce executive orders 
against racial discrimination by federal contractors, unions played a crucial role 
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in shifting the enforcement of equal employment law to the courts, which lacked 
the administrative capacity to effectively oversee complex workplace desegrega-
tion orders.
The fact that the building trades unions were not able to completely stop af-
firmative action has caused historians to overlook the effect that union resistance 
had on the evolution of public policy. The building trades unions believed that 
the intervention of the Philadelphia Plan in the construction industry would 
compromise their hiring halls and their apprenticeship programs, and violate 
the prohibition against racial quotas in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 
Convinced that they were the targets of a Republican Party conspiracy against 
organized labor, they lobbied their Democratic Party allies in Congress and the 
Department of Labor in 1969 to stop the plan. Rather than acceding to the deseg-
regation orders of the state and federal government fair employment agencies, 
the unions used aggressive litigation throughout the 1960s and early 1970s to 
forestall their regulation. Both their legal and legislative resistance failed in the 
short term. In addition, the union rallies against the Philadelphia Plan in 1969 
undermined their cause by producing media images of white workers whose rage 
against “forced integration” crossed over into over antiblack racism.
Yet, even though they failed to completely stop affirmative action, the build-
ing trades unions were neither innocent victims nor passive objects of reform. 
Considering their labor rights inalienable, many white workers responded to the 
implementation of the Philadelphia Plan in 1969 and 1970 by walking off the 
job. When forced to return, hostile union journeymen hazed new black jour-
neymen off jobs with impunity, and others simply refused to teach black ap-
prentices. Lacking the resources and political will to overcome union resistance, 
the Department of Labor backed off from enforcing the Philadelphia Plan by 
promoting voluntary desegregation plans for the construction industry over 
government-imposed plans, local “hometown plans” over a single national one, 
and conciliation over punishment when “goals and timetables” were not met. 
Rather than securing everyone’s cooperation, the return of the Department of 
Labor to voluntarism allowed unions (and contractors) to openly violate the 
plans. By 1971, the resulting chaos pressured the Richard Nixon White House to 
either redouble its efforts or abandon workplace desegregation, as it had school 
and housing desegregation, as too politically costly.3
The choice facing Nixon of whether to enforce the Philadelphia Plan was not 
as simple as it may appear in retrospect. Nixon believed that affirmative action 
was necessary, although he was wary of its political costs. Because the building 
trades unions were solidly enmeshed in Democratic Party politics, he originally 
felt little allegiance to them. But when construction workers organized a wave 
of pro–Vietnam War demonstrations across the country in support of Nixon’s 
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foreign policy in May and June 1970, they transformed Nixon’s political calculus. 
Branding themselves instant spokesmen for Nixon’s previously abstract and rhe-
torical “silent majority,” New York City building trades union leaders disavowed 
ulterior motives for their patriotic rallies. Their new hard hat cultural politics 
promoted a shared commitment to masculinity, law and order, and anticom-
munism that supposedly transcended partisan politics. Nixon was extremely 
grateful—indeed desperate—for their support. Reaching out to the unions, he 
and union leaders cocreated a hard hat movement whose media representations 
staged the racial reconciliation between the white working class and the Repub-
lican Party. Presenting this movement as a restoration of white men’s moral au-
thority against liberal permissiveness, both union and Nixon officials used the 
media icon of the hard hat to shore up their power against critics on the left.
Although the hard hat movement did not explicitly evoke the politics of race, 
the subversion of the Philadelphia Plan was the essential precondition that made 
it possible for the unions to ally themselves with Nixon. The New York building 
trades unions made their support for Nixon’s reelection in 1972 contingent on 
his backing off from enforcing the desegregation of the construction industry. 
Forced to choose between the Philadelphia Plan and an alliance with the build-
ing trades unions on support for his foreign policy, Nixon chose the unions. It 
was this choice, forced by union pressure and not the inevitable result of a coher-
ent domestic political program against the unions or the civil rights movement, 
that finalized Nixon’s decision to court the support of the unions instead of try-
ing to smash them.
Thus, less than two years after creating the Philadelphia Plan, Nixon gave the 
green light to reversing his always tentative support for affirmative action. While 
his staff hollowed out the substance of the Department of Labor’s affirmative ac-
tion enforcement within and outside the construction industry, Nixon declared 
himself to be against “quotas” and removed Art Fletcher, the architect of the Phil-
adelphia Plan, from the Department of Labor. The busting of the building trades 
unions, which he had briefly flirted with, would be, Nixon quipped, “somebody 
else’s problem.”4
The Nixon–hard hat alliance had two profound effects on the politics of the 
1970s. First, it shaped the evolution of government power over the workplace. 
The building trades unions had lost control of the Department of Labor when 
Nixon took office in 1969. But their resistance to its affirmative action decrees 
stalled its plans, while the aggressive courting of Nixon by the New York unions 
effectively stymied its capacity to adapt. The union pressure paid off. The build-
ing trades unions effectively recaptured the Department of Labor when, as an 
expression of gratitude for their support, Nixon made Peter Brennan, the head 
of the New York Building Trades Council, the U.S. secretary of labor in 1973. 
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Brennan, in turn, did not abolish affirmative action as much as he shifted its en-
forcement to the courts. Without a cabinet-level agency such as the Department 
of Labor to enforce equal employment law, employers adopted new affirmative 
action guidelines largely to defend themselves against the threat of litigation. The 
retreat from the Philadelphia Plan thus contributed to the transformation of af-
firmative action, as Kevin Yuill puts it, from a “civil rights demand to a watered-
down bureaucratic program.”5
Second, the building trades union leaders’ creation of a hard hat movement 
played a key role in developing Nixon’s outreach to white ethnic and blue-collar 
voters in the urban North through “social” rather than economic issues. This move-
ment helped delink the cultural symbols of an implicitly male white working-class 
consciousness from Democratic Party politics outside the South.
The broad outlines of Nixon’s attempt to reach out to so-called white ethnics 
and his “romancing [of] the new right worker” are well known.6 But most his-
tories of the strategy describe Nixon’s alliance with conservative unions as only 
tangentially related to the politics of the Philadelphia Plan. Numerous works 
have contributed to our understanding of how the hard hats came to be seen as 
“the shock troops for the emerging New Right” in the 1970s.7 Previously over-
looked conversations in the Nixon tapes and recently disclosed documents in the 
Nixon papers reconnect these studies to the development of affirmative action 
as public policy. These sources shine a light on a part of labor history that union 
leaders have never wanted to acknowledge—that some conservative labor lead-
ers, rather than being the victims of identity politics, cultivated and benefited 
from a class consciousness that was exclusively white and male. Although the 
hard hat alliance collapsed in the wake of the Watergate scandal, the heroic qual-
ity that Nixon imparted to the defection of white working-class men from the 
Democratic Party allowed Nixon and the unions to reconnect opposition to the 
civil rights movement with mainstream discourses of U.S. liberalism that persist 
to this day. They did this not by opposing civil rights laws per se but by finding 
common cause in making the law unenforceable.
Subverting the Revised Philadelphia Plan
The Philadelphia Plan fused the politics of civil rights and union-busting rather 
than treating the former as a smokescreen for the latter. Although acting in re-
sponse to African American protest movements, Nixon’s Department of Labor 
had its own multiple and independent motivations for taking the unprecedented 
step of imposing involuntary affirmative action requirements on the construc-
tion industry in 1969. Republicans had a long-standing hostility to the powerful 
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building trades unions and the Democratic Party machine politics they helped 
prop up in cities across the country. Labor Secretary George Shultz believed that 
bypassing the construction industry apprenticeship programs would increase 
the labor supply and put downward pressure on wages that could spur new con-
struction, create more jobs, and curb government spending. And Shultz had a 
complementary commitment to make jobs available to racial minorities in a civil 
rights program that would supposedly reduce the need for welfare.8
Nixon tentatively embraced the revival of the Philadelphia Plan by the De-
partment of Labor for these reasons, as well as to reduce inflation.9 It was not 
until a few months after the Department of Labor had initiated the revival of the 
Philadelphia Plan, when union resistance became fierce, that Nixon became in-
terested in its potential to exacerbate conflict between two of the key constituen-
cies of the Democratic Party—white union members and African Americans.10 
But from late 1969 through early 1971, even that idea was tentative, contested, 
and not well thought out.
As the Nixon administration charted this uncertain course, it created what 
Hugh Davis Graham, an historian of affirmative action policy, has described as 
policy “incoherence,” or contradictory tendencies. Only in retrospect were these 
contradictions clearly resolved into what we might call classic Nixonian politics: 
preempt your enemies’ agendas to confound their expectations, divide their loy-
alties, defer follow-through to a divided electorate, and then gain new followers 
by blaming the policy for its own failure to produce a compromise. With the fed-
eral government moving in multiple directions at once, local struggles informed 
the creation of new political blocs. And battles within the Nixon administra-
tion over the enforcement of the Philadelphia Plan became increasingly heated 
as interest groups—particularly within organized labor—began to pressure the 
administration.11
Nixon did not have a preconceived plan to impose affirmative action when 
he was first elected president. But when he tapped Arthur Fletcher to be his un-
dersecretary of labor for wage and labor standards in spring 1969, he inadver-
tently set change in motion. Fletcher, a black Republican who had run a strong 
but unsuccessful race for lieutenant governor of Washington state in 1968, was 
one of few black Republicans whose career seemed to be on the rise at the time. 
Fletcher had served in leadership roles in Kansas and California Republican 
Party politics in the 1950s and 1960s, including a stint on Nixon’s presidential 
campaign in California in 1960. He had moved to the Tri-Cities, Washington, in 
1965, where he promoted fair employment at the Hanford Nuclear Power Reser-
vation, administered a War on Poverty job-training program, and was elected to 
the Pasco City Council. Signaling his commitment to take leadership of Nixon’s 
fair employment politics, Fletcher attached two conditions to his appointment: 
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(1) that equal employment be considered a “labor standard” (implicitly within 
the purview of his job title), and (2) that, because the OFCC would be reporting 
directly to him and not to the Secretary of Labor as it had previously, he be given 
the power to appoint the new OFCC director.12
The OFCC had a credibility problem among civil rights organizations when 
Fletcher arrived. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP) had recently accused the small and ineffectual OFCC of being 
captive to “bigoted labor unions” because, under the Lyndon Johnson adminis-
tration, it had drafted but then refused to implement the Philadelphia Plan. In 
addition, nearly two decades of aggressive criticism of racism in the building 
trades unions by NAACP Labor Relations Director Herbert Hill, along with open 
and steadfast refusal by the unions to compromise, had made these unions, ac-
cording to Fletcher, “the central symbol for our time of the quest for equality in 
employment opportunity.”13
Having set out to change the image of the OFCC, Fletcher quickly rose to be-
come the most outspoken advocate of the Philadelphia Plan. In that role, he be-
came, according to the Washington Post, “the go between for any black, Chicano, 
or Indian who tries to deal with the Nixon administration.” Fletcher personally 
announced the issuance of the Revised Philadelphia Plan during a press confer-
ence in Philadelphia on June 27, 1969. The Revised Plan took effect in the city 
of Philadelphia immediately, but Fletcher also claimed that the plan “will be put 
into effect in all the major cities across the Nation as soon as possible.”14
According to William Gould, professor of fair employment law, between late 
June and September 1969, during the comment period before the Philadelphia 
Plan could be expanded to other cities, “the winds of Philadelphia were being felt 
throughout the land.” Mass protests by African Americans in cities around the 
country demanded the immediate expansion of the Philadelphia Plan, forcing 
both Democratic and Republican elected officials at the local level to reach out 
to the Department of Labor for help with “crisis management.” Fletcher then 
positioned himself to reinforce support for the Philadelphia Plan as the only way 
to resolve the urban crisis.15
The resistance of the building trades unions to the Philadelphia Plan and its 
expansion was immediate and intense. Union leaders marshaled their allies in 
the Department of Labor and Congress in an attempt to quash the plan. They 
also organized massive counterdemonstrations against the extension of the plan 
to other cities, at which they demanded compensation for wages lost during the 
protests and called on politicians to use the police to protect their workplaces. 
When contractors and freedom movement activists negotiated ad hoc affirma-
tive action deals across the country in anticipation of federal intervention, union 
members raised the specter of hate strikes by walking off the job. In all these 
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activities, union leaders claimed to be color-blind, championed the token and 
often ineffectual minority preapprenticeship plans they had adopted to deflect 
criticism, and stated that they opposed the Philadelphia Plan’s bypassing of 
government-certified apprenticeship programs and collective bargaining rights.
The union criticism of freedom movement activists as the misguided tools 
of corporate interests revived old stereotypes of black workers as union-busters 
and enabled overt racism to come to the fore during union-led counterdemon-
strations. Protests by the building trades unions in Pittsburgh in August and 
September 1969 were especially hostile. In Pittsburgh, after a protest by a few 
hundred the day before, over 4,000 white construction workers demonstrated 
on August 29, 1969. They invoked labor politics by wearing hard hats and de-
manding wages lost during the protests. But many carried signs and chanted 
slogans supporting arch-segregationist George Wallace for president in 1972, 
putting on display what one commentator called “labor’s double standard” in 
conflating union rights with racial privilege. Similar protests of thousands of 
workers—with a pageantry of U.S. flags and inverted black freedom movement 
slogans such as “equal rights for whites” and “we build not burn”—took place 
in Chicago in September, in Seattle in October, and elsewhere on a smaller scale 
during fall 1969.16
It was in Chicago where the confluence of the national politics of the Philadel-
phia Plan and local resistance from the building trades unions was most intense. 
Fletcher convened public hearings in Chicago in September 1969 to provide a 
legal foundation for the expansion of the Philadelphia Plan to other cities. Yet his 
first attempt to hold a hearing was stifled when hundreds of construction work-
ers, seemingly with the assent of the Chicago police, filled the hotel conference 
room where the meeting was being held, causing the meeting to be canceled. 
Afterward, according to Fletcher, “the management of the hotel asked us not to 
hold the hearing and, in effect, told us to get out, because of the trouble.” Work-
ers’ angry catcalls and jostling of his entourage portended violence. Fletcher later 
learned that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had picked up rumors 
of a contract put out on his life. “Here in Chicago,” he recalled, “the apparent 
helplessness of the federal government would destroy not only the EEO [Equal 
Employment Opportunity] program but many other programs as well. It could 
not be that a mass of hard hats could stop the federal government from func-
tioning.” Fletcher successfully reconvened the hearings under federal guard on 
federal property, but he and black activists required police escorts to keep from 
being assaulted. Fighting later broke out outside among blacks, union members, 
and police.17
The firestorm that Fletcher weathered in Chicago had a transformative ef-
fect on him. He described his experience as a moment when he “faced the 
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elementary forces of life, racism and fear of loss of jobs,” resulting in a battle of 
“naked power.”18 With his illusions thus stripped from him about what would be 
required to overcome resistance to affirmative action, he became an unabashed 
opponent of the building trades unions. Removed from the context of his ex-
perience in Chicago, Fletcher’s criticism of labor-union racism has often been 
misconstrued as evidence that he was antiunion; actual evidence for such ac-
cusations is sketchy.19 Believing that Chicago presented a northern form of mas-
sive resistance, Fletcher viewed the hearings there as a historic breakthrough for 
racial equality and as a confirmation of his belief that only the Republican Party 
could help blacks achieve equal economic opportunity.
Yet Nixon’s commitment to the Philadelphia Plan, as Fletcher probably knew 
but did not admit, was uneven. Nixon was well aware that he had received little 
support from black voters during his campaign and that George Wallace’s strong 
showing in 1968 demonstrated a growing backlash against the enforcement of 
civil rights law. Having been elected president of the United States with 43 per-
cent of the popular vote, Nixon spent his first term in office obsessed with creat-
ing a “new majority” for the Republican Party.20
Invoking presidential privilege to enforce executive orders, the White House 
effectively beat back the opposition to the Philadelphia Plan in Congress before 
the 1969 Christmas holiday. But it did not take long before Nixon reconsidered 
his actions. During and after the 1968 election, Kevin Phillips, Republican Party 
strategist, had advised Nixon to pursue a “Southern strategy” by appealing to seg-
regationist Democrats to switch their party allegiance to the Republican Party, 
popularizing the idea after the election in his book, The Emerging Republican 
Majority. During the winter holiday, Nixon read Phillips’s book, and in early 
January he told his aide H. R. Haldeman to “use Phillips as an analyst—study his 
strategy—don’t think in terms of old-time ethnics, go for Poles, Italians, Irish, 
must learn to understand Silent Majority. . . . don’t go for Jews and Blacks.”21
As pressure from the construction unions grew, the White House showed 
signs of retreat on the Philadelphia Plan, even though it had successfully divided 
liberal Democrats. On January 11, 1970, George Meany, the executive secretary 
of the American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(AFL-CIO) and a plumber from New York City, held a press conference at which 
he dismissed the Philadelphia Plan as “bunk” and as an attempt to win “brownie 
points” from civil rights groups. On January 13, Nixon, reading a news summary 
of Meany’s remarks, uncomfortably noted, “this hurts us. With our constituency 
we gained little on the play.” On January 28, Nixon met with Richard Scammon, 
coauthor of The Real Majority, to discuss how “the social issue” (which Phillips 
summarized as concern about “law and order, permissiveness, campus anarchy, 
[and] racial engineering”) could be tapped to galvanize the “silent majority.” 
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During the meeting, Nixon praised Meany for his “guts and courage.” Two 
months later, in a meeting with prominent academics from around the country 
at Harvard University, Nixon complained, according to the Washington Post, that 
“there is little political gain” in civil rights advocacy and that the Philadelphia 
Plan “was giving him no credit among Negroes.” The day after the meeting, a 
January 1970 memo from Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a Nixon advisor, recom-
mending that the president pursue a policy of “benign neglect” toward African 
Americans was leaked to the press. By April, Nixon had become even more cyni-
cal, telling Haldeman that the only blacks who would work with him were “Uncle 
Toms, and we should work on them and forget militants.”22
It was in this context of fierce union resistance, Nixon’s cynicism about civil 
rights, and his desire to reach out to a “silent majority,” that the Department of 
Labor quietly subverted the Philadelphia Plan. In late September 1969, Fletcher 
had announced that the Department of Labor sought to extend the Philadel-
phia Plan to nine other cities: New York, Chicago, Pittsburgh, Detroit, Boston, 
St. Louis, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle. But the OFCC at the time had 
only twelve contract compliance officers for a decentralized industry with thou-
sands of employers and millions of seasonal employees.23 In the face of massive 
resistance in the North, Secretary of Labor George Shultz lacked the adminis-
trative capacity and political will to impose affirmative action orders across the 
country. So he used the threat of an imposed plan to inspire the negotiation of 
voluntary, local, hometown solutions on a city-by-city basis.
Whether Shultz shifted the expansion of the Philadelphia Plan from imposed 
plans to voluntary ones at the behest of the White House is unclear. As early as 
August 11, 1969, Fletcher himself acknowledged, “the federal government simply 
cannot involve itself in manpower planning in every city in the country. It cannot 
even develop the framework—a Philadelphia Plan—for every city in the country. 
It doesn’t have the resources, and basically it’s not the right level of government 
anyway.” What affirmative action had thus initiated was a fierce debate over what 
constituted the “right level of government.” By March 1970, Nixon began provid-
ing an answer by defending hometown plans to building trades union leaders as 
the kind of “voluntary approach” to affirmative action he stood for.24
The capitulation by the Department of Labor to Mayor Daley’s political ma-
chine in Chicago months after the September hearings showed just how inef-
fective the voluntarism of the Nixon administration would be. The Department 
of Labor certified the Chicago hometown plan—the second such plan after 
Boston—on January 12, 1970. The plan was a success in principle because it in-
cluded “minority community” representatives in construction industry labor ne-
gotiations, extended OFCC power to regulate private industry as well as federal 
contracts, and enabled the Department of Labor’s Manpower Administration 
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to fund the plan. But the blueprint for negotiating hometown plans was fatally 
weakened by the certification of the Chicago Plan. Fletcher himself was at pains 
to explain to reporters why the voluntary Chicago Plan lacked the craft-specific 
hiring goals of the Philadelphia Plan and lacked its penalties for not meeting 
these vague goals.25 With Chicago minority community representatives rendered 
ineffective by Daley machine pressure, the Department of Labor certified a plan 
that subverted the whole point of affirmative action—to set measurable goals so 
as to punish noncompliance when voluntary desegregation failed.
Just as it was watering down the Philadelphia Plan, the Department of Labor 
also weakened the broader affirmative action decree modeled after it. Less than 
two weeks after issuing Order No. 4, the Department of Labor qualified its re-
quirement that all federal contractors meet statistical benchmarks for hiring 
nonwhite workers to, according to the New York Times, “take into account the 
availability and eligibility of minority group workers.”26 The order still inspired 
the adoption of contract compliance programs by local and state governments 
across the country, but the enforcement of those programs could now be subject 
to further bias, debate, equivocation, and delay.
The Nixon administration had thus established the legal foundation for af-
firmative action while simultaneously backing away from its enforcement. This 
set the stage for chaotic battles that fused the emerging culture war with debates 
over the limits of federal government authority. When Secretary Shultz an-
nounced the extension of the Philadelphia Plan to nineteen more cities on Feb-
ruary 9, 1970, the threat remained heavily, although not totally, symbolic.27 Local 
building trades unions, although publicly howling against racial quotas, still had 
the ability to hollow out the substance of those plans, using their negotiating 
savvy to make the plans weak and unenforceable. Or, because the hometown 
plans required the assent of all parties, the unions or contractors could sim-
ply drag the negotiations on interminably. By refusing even basic concessions 
as violations of collective bargaining agreements or employer prerogatives, they 
pushed the meaning of voluntary cooperation to its limit and challenged the De-
partment of Labor to impose a plan that it could not enforce. Both forms of re-
sistance were especially prevalent before October of 1971, when legal challenges 
to the Philadelphia Plan were exhausted when the Supreme Court declined to 
rule the plan unconstitutional.28
This resistance to the Philadelphia Plan sapped the energy from the direct 
action campaigns of 1969 by initiating interminable negotiations that produced 
few immediate concessions. When the plans failed to meet their weak goals or 
when negotiations stalled, internal divisions within the local civil rights coalitions 
often became more intense, as groups wanting to administer the plans (usually 
allied with organized labor or the Urban League) found themselves at odds with 
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more insurgent and activist voices in the black community. Multiracial coalitions 
of nonwhite men seeking access to the trades were also strained in places such as 
Chicago and New York as differences over how confrontational they should be 
inflamed preexisting tensions between minority communities.
The Department of Labor had set itself up for failure. It was reticent to im-
pose the plans or void federal contracts in the face of rampant noncompliance, 
but it was too understaffed and ill-equipped to impose more specific penalties on 
unions or contractors who openly violated its plans. “We were soldiers fighting 
a lost cause,” Fletcher reflected four years later. “The result was two years lost, a 
long series of futile and fruitless negotiations, no really successful Plans, and a 
new and deeper level of bitterness in the black community.”29
Despite Fletcher’s frustration, the existence of the Philadelphia Plan and the 
threat of imposed plans still provided activists around the country with some 
leverage to force moderate concessions through the hometown plan process. In 
addition, the Philadelphia Plan and Order No. 4 pushed state, county, and local 
government agencies—as the major recipients of federal funds—to set up their 
own nondiscrimination laws and contract compliance programs, some of which 
were stronger than federal law. This, in turn, provided minority and also some 
women activists another means to gain entry to professions historically reserved 
for white men. Even if none of the plans could be considered a success, they 
produced hundreds of new fronts in the war against the politics of whiteness and 
masculinity that had long rationalized economic inequality in the United States.
Absent aggressive government support and without full employment pro-
grams to lessen the stakes of desegregation, activists seeking to transform the 
U.S. workplace during the 1970s faced poor odds. As the economy entered a re-
cession in 1970, the Nixon administration added to the woes of the construction 
industry by cutting federal construction spending by 75 percent.30 The Depart-
ment of Labor hometown plan “goals” for minority hiring—focused largely on 
federal contracts, based on the percentage of nonwhite people in the population, 
and independent of the variable cycles of the construction industry—further in-
creased unemployment for white construction workers while providing remark-
ably few jobs for nonwhite workers.
It was in this context that, during 1970 and 1971, local on-the-job resistance 
by white workers to affirmative action in the construction industry spread like 
wildfire while the federal government proved either unwilling or unable to stop 
it. As in Seattle (Griffey, chap. 7 in this volume), white workers hazed nonwhite 
workers until they left the job or simply gave nonwhite workers nothing to do 
and refused to teach them the trade. Contractors, meanwhile, moved nonwhite 
workers from job to job to keep multiple sites in what was cynically referred 
to as “paper compliance.” Because hell came to those who fought, graft and 
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mismanagement (most spectacularly in Chicago and Pittsburgh) became the 
paths of least resistance in the face of open resistance to new, nonwhite, non-
union labor entering the construction workplace through affirmative action. 
The hometown plan system made it easy for nonwhite workers who showed up 
to jobs but made no effort to learn, and it rewarded administrators who certified 
such dishonesty as “affirmative action.” But with the goals met only on paper and 
corruption rampant, no one was satisfied. As a result, a shared disillusionment in 
government grew as the law was flouted on all sides. Animosity over this state of 
affairs on the job provides a crucial context for understanding the significance of 
the hard hat revolt of the early 1970s.
Naming the Backlash: The Invention 
of the Hard Hat
John Ehrlichman, Nixon’s aide in charge of his domestic policy, later recalled 
the enthusiasm with which the White House saw white and black workers fight-
ing over the Philadelphia Plan.31 But how open to be about setting these two 
major Democratic Party constituents against one another, and how far to pursue 
it, was never agreed on.32 Beginning in spring 1970, books such as The Emerg-
ing Republican Majority and The Real Majority and a Department of Labor re-
port titled “The Problem of the Blue-Collar Worker” provoked a spirited debate 
within the Nixon administration about whether and how to appeal to organized 
labor—a debate that continued through the rest of 1970 and was not resolved 
until mid-1971.
This debate over Nixon’s relationship to the white working class became in-
creasingly urgent on May 8, 1970. That day, hundreds of New York City construc-
tion workers descended from the buildings they were working on to viciously 
attack anti–Vietnam War protesters. The protesters were marching through Wall 
Street to protest Nixon’s invasion of Cambodia and the shooting of four student 
protesters at Kent State on May 4. Wielding construction tools and wearing hard 
hats, the construction workers violently dispersed the protest and then marched 
on City Hall to demand that city leaders fully hoist the flag (it was at half mast for 
the Kent State victims). More construction workers, seemingly coordinated, ar-
rived in waves to join the attacks, swelling the mob’s ranks to as many as five hun-
dred as they shouted patriotic chants and assaulted long-haired people whom 
they assumed were opposed to the Vietnam war. After leaving City Hall, the mob 
attacked students at Pace College and chased bloodied and beaten victims of the 
melee into Trinity Church, where they ripped down the church Red Cross ban-
ner and twice tried to break through its gates. The unprovoked rampage lasted 
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four hours and left over seventy people injured, some very seriously—including 
a twenty-nine-year-old Democratic candidate for State Senate, who was rushed 
to the hospital with “his right eye completely closed, a large welt on his head, and 
five boot marks were imprinted on his back where he had been stomped after he 
was down.”33
The riot had clearly been planned, but by whom and to what degree have 
never been proven. A seemingly more spontaneous event had occurred the day 
before, when several dozen construction workers reportedly threw debris at an-
tiwar protesters on Wall Street. But on May 8, according to The Nation, workers 
had been paid during their time off work (some reports claimed they were paid 
as much as double a regular day’s wage). The police knew the attack was coming 
ahead of time, but did not intervene or make any arrests. Workers had U.S. flags at 
the ready for their violent march. And “agents of a small, right-wing sheet, the 
New York Graphic” were immediately on the scene distributing handbills and giv-
ing orders and speeches through megaphones. The Wall Street Journal reported 
that one worker “who said his life would be in danger if he was identified, claimed 
the attack was organized by shop stewards with the support of some contractors. 
He said one contractor offered his men cash bonuses to join the fray.”34
White House outreach to the union leaders following the riot was extremely 
swift. The day after the Kent State shootings, Charles “Chuck” Colson, the spe-
cial counsel to the president tasked with cultivating interest group support for 
Nixon, went to work. Colson met with Jay Lovestone, the head of the AFL-CIO 
International Affairs Division and an ardent anticommunist whom Colson later 
described as “too hard-line [about détente] for reason.” At the meeting, the two 
discussed a plan to get the formal endorsement of the AFL-CIO for the Vietnam 
War. As Colson sought labor movement support, the president avoided Washing-
ton, D.C., and worried those close to him by engaging in erratic behavior as waves 
of student strikes against the war closed universities and gripped the nation.35
Conservative members of the AFL-CIO, concerned by the growing radicaliza-
tion of the labor movement, began reaching out to the White House to offer their 
support. As Philip Foner documented, Nixon’s escalation of the war to Cambo-
dia “brought into the antiwar movement huge sections of the trade unions never 
before involved in such protests.” In the San Francisco Bay Area, even building 
trades union leaders and Teamsters joined the regional labor movement to de-
mand an immediate cease-fire in Vietnam. The death on May 9 of the potentially 
most prominent labor movement spokesperson against the war, United Auto 
Workers (UAW) President Walter Reuther, reduced the visibility of the growing 
antiwar sentiment in the labor movement, but the AFL-CIO still felt it had to 
respond to the antiwar activism within labor. As a result, on May 13 the AFL-CIO 
Executive Council officially endorsed the Vietnam War.36
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Although the AFL-CIO presented its endorsement as a nonpartisan patriotic 
act, Nixon’s advisers treated it and the construction worker riot as a potentially 
historic breakthrough for the Republican Party. Tom Huston, White House 
deputy counsel, captured this feeling with impassioned memos calling for the 
aggressive courting of organized labor because the hard hat violence provided 
the only real evidence of grassroots support for Nixon. On May 12, Huston wrote 
to the president’s aides demanding that they block any Department of Justice 
inquiry into the riot. On May 13, he explained, “what we saw in New York on 
Friday was the first manifestation of a willingness to fight for the America the 
blue-collar American loves,” adding that “the greatest bulwark against revolution 
in America is the working class” and “we need to quit talking about the great 
Silent Majority and start talking to it.”37
Meanwhile, New York building trades union leaders, stigmatized by accusa-
tions of racism and under pressure from Mayor John Lindsay and the Depart-
ment of Labor to desegregate, were emboldened by their new celebrity status. In 
the week following the riot, Peter Brennan, head of the New York City Building 
and Construction Trades Council, accelerated his pro-war organizing among the 
200,000 council members and over 110 union locals. On May 11 and 12, thou-
sands of construction workers “roamed through Lower Manhattan in organized 
bands,” occasionally assaulting passersby, as some downtown workers cheered. 
On May 15, the crowds became more diverse as between 2,500 and 5,000 “con-
struction workers, longshoremen, and white-collar workers” marched together 
through the New York financial district. The New York Times later reported that 
the workers’ march received a “ ‘Hero’ Welcome”: “There was applause, confetti 
and data tape from the Wall street canyons at times, as if the hard hats were hero 
astronauts.”38
Meanwhile, Brennan announced plans for a massive march in New York 
on May 20 and worked with other building trades leaders to encourage simi-
lar demonstrations elsewhere to “set an example to the rest of the country and 
be a source of inspiration to our men overseas.” The White House, which had 
already been considering Reverend Billy Graham’s advice that Nixon stage a 
“pro- America rally” to counter the antiwar protests, supported the march, with 
Lovestone serving as liaison between Brennan and Colson during the lead-up. 
But the organizing came mainly from the New York Building Trades Council, 
with support from Thomas “Teddy” Gleason, head of the International Long-
shoremen Association (ILA).39
The resulting demonstration on May 20 was massive, mobilizing over 100,000 
construction workers (who were encouraged by their unions to wear hard hats) 
and their allies. The pageantry of the march combined the celebration of milita-
ristic patriotism, masculine toughness, and working-class populism. It marshaled 
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a striking imagery that, whether viewed as creeping fascism or a restoration of 
moral order, most observers saw as a portentous rupture with 1960s liberalism. 
Heeding New York leaders’ call for solidarity, thousands of construction workers 
in Buffalo, Pittsburgh, and San Diego organized similar marches, some of which 
were marred by violence against antiwar counterdemonstrators.40
The New York march deeply impressed White House officials, with Colson 
later referring to it as “a seminal event.” Steven Bull, Nixon White House staffer, 
wrote to Charles Colson afterward, speculating that “Obviously, more of these 
will be occurring throughout the Nation, perhaps partially as a result of your 
clandestine activity.” He added approvingly, “This display of emotional activity 
from the ‘hard hats’ provides an opportunity, if under the proper leadership, to 
forge a new alliance and perhaps result in the emergence of a ‘new right.’ ”41
It was an opportunity soon seized, with Colson anointing himself the “cus-
todian of our Hard Hat constituency”—a position through which he gained 
increasing power within the White House. At Colson’s suggestion, the president 
personally thanked Brennan for organizing the May 20 march. Colson then set 
a meeting between Nixon and New York City building trade union leaders “to 
present a hard hat to the President . . . as the symbol of freedom.” This was done, 
Colson later recalled, over the “almost a unanimous opposition” of White House 
staff, who saw the move as crass “pandering.” Before the meeting, Colson ad-
vised the president to not mention the riot because “The construction workers, 
while a symbol to most Americans of loyalty and patriotism, are also a symbol to 
some of repression and anti-intellectualism.” Instead, Colson counseled Nixon 
to “express your appreciation for their demonstration of loyalty to the coun-
try (I would recommend emphasizing country rather than this Administration 
since many of these men feel that the Secretary of Labor has not been friendly 
and they disagree with some of our labor policies).”42
Nixon’s meeting with New York construction union leaders provided the 
presidential imprimatur to the hard hat movement. By seizing on the hard hat 
iconography, he disassociated the movement from its vigilante origins to make 
construction workers the representatives of a “silent majority” that had previously 
been a political abstraction. With this encouragement, and probably behind-the-
scenes coordination, hard hat marches (and violence) soon spread to other cities, 
many with the sponsorship of the AFL-CIO Building and Construction Trades 
Council. On May 31 in Tempe, Arizona, approximately 300 construction workers 
violently waded into an antiwar rally of 2,000, requiring more than 100 police to 
break up the resulting fistfights. On June 8, 45,000 construction workers paraded 
through the streets of St. Louis to show their support for the war and assaulted 
antiwar protesters who dared display dissent. On June 11, building trades union 
leaders in Seattle staged a Civil Responsibility Rally, bringing together 2,500 
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construction workers, police officers, and their families to protest “a complete 
breakdown of law enforcement” in the supposed coddling of antiwar protesters 
and black militants (they failed to get the 14,000 they had hoped would attend). 
On June 15, roughly 75 percent of Baltimore’s construction trade union mem-
bers marched along with firemen in a parade of 15,000 people to honor the flag, 
support the war, and oppose both the New Left and hippie counterculture. On 
June 25, Nixon staff sought to finally add his presence to these movements by 
organizing a massive pro-Nixon parade and rally of tens of thousands of people 
in St. Louis to celebrate “what is right about America.” The event, meant to stage 
Nixon’s supposed popularity in “Middle America,” relied in part on Ironworker 
Union President John Lyons’s “building a crowd” at the last minute.43
By the end of June, the cumulative effect of one month of aggressive pro-
police, pro–Vietnam War events took hold. Throughout the rest of 1970, the 
term hard hat spread like wildfire through the popular culture to become what 
the Washington Post described as a “new political catch-all label” to describe a 
structure of feeling for the New Right. Hard hats became symbols of opposition 
to the New Left and support for the Vietnam War, reframing a broader cultural 
war already underway. Although Merle Haggard had released his antihippie an-
them “Okie from Muskogee” in 1969, it was not until after the events of May 
1970 that the press began to refer to Haggard as the “poet laureate of the hard 
hats.” Innumerable newspaper pieces about everything from hard hat hairstyles 
to film characters proliferated in the months and years that followed. Through 
them, working-class conservatives—and often the whole white working class—
were celebrated or stigmatized for supposedly having a hard hat aesthetic. So 
when the TV sitcom All in the Family launched in January of 1971, featuring a 
bigoted white male character named Archie Bunker, the immediate popularity of 
the show rested on its controversial portrayal of Bunker’s “stereotyped, hard hat 
interpretation of modern morality.”44
The power of the hard hat image came partly from its ideological flexibility but 
also from its expression of an explicitly male sensibility. Its populist anti- elitism 
evoked New Deal sensibilities, but its celebration of masculine force against the 
supposed excesses of liberal tolerance was distinctly reactionary. Brennan per-
sonally helped the White House understand the fundamentally emotive, gen-
dered, and nonpartisan nature of the movement. Colson later wrote to Nixon 
describing Brennan’s explanation “for the ‘hard hat’ support of you more percep-
tively than I think we have analyzed it.”
He said that the “hard hats” wave the flag and cheer the President but 
that, in and of itself, does not translate into votes. Moreover most of the 
“hard hats” don’t like our economic policies and feel that we are pushing 
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them too hard in the civil rights area. What is winning their political 
loyalty is their admiration for your masculinity. The “hard hats”, who 
are a tough breed, have come to respect you as a tough, courageous, 
man’s man. Brennan’s thesis is that this image of you will win their votes 
more than the patriotism theme.45
While the cultural politics of the hard hat movement took on a life of its 
own in popular culture, the first test of its political possibilities came during 
the 1970 mid-term elections. Following the hard hat march, some of the most 
powerful New York labor leaders began to offer their clandestine support for the 
Conservative Party campaign of James Buckley for U.S. Senate in 1970. Toward 
the end of June, Haldeman ordered Pat Buchanan, Nixon speech writer and ad-
viser on outreach to Catholic voters, to “put someone on to the New York sen-
ate race . . . who can counsel Buckley on strategy and planning” by “going for the 
Catholic Democrats and the Nixon Republicans and really playing this up.” By 
September, Colson was secretly organizing what he called “hardhat support for 
Buckley,” facilitated by Brennan; Mike Maye, New York firefighter union leader; 
and others who were also engaged in what Colson cryptically called “political 
chicanery.”46
Buckley’s election as a pro-war third-party candidate and the willingness of 
the unions to organize their communities to break ranks with the Democratic 
Party deeply impressed Colson. Soon after, he began to obsessively follow inter-
nal discussions in the AFL-CIO in the hopes that he could facilitate the unlikely 
defection of the unions to Nixon in 1972. Lovestone nurtured Colson’s hopes by 
providing him with information during biweekly meetings. Meanwhile, Colson 
became closer to conservative New York union leaders following Buckley’s elec-
tion. Colson was soon referring to Brennan as one of his union “spies” and listed 
Thomas Gleason, ILA president; Jesse Calhoun, Marine Engineers leader; and 
Harry Van Arsdale, Central Labor Council leader and former president of the 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) Local 3, as his other 
“lines of communication in New York.” Politically speaking, this group of labor 
leaders, and especially Brennan, determined the shape of hard hat politics and 
Nixon’s outreach to organized labor in the years that followed.47
Affirmative Action and the “Social Issue”
Despite Colson’s union allies in New York, Nixon’s support from organized 
labor decreased rather than increased during late 1970 and early 1971, mainly 
because of the worsening economy. The poor performance of Republicans in the 
1970 elections, and the fewer-than-anticipated union votes for Republican Party 
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candidates, inspired some White House officials to argue that the hard hat alli-
ance had produced only marginal results and that it was time to “take the gloves 
off.” As organized labor continued to criticize Nixon’s economic policies during 
the first few months of 1971, these debates raged within the White House, and 
Nixon’s domestic programs evolved in ways that were often at odds with one 
another.48
Nixon’s choice in late February to suspend the Davis-Bacon guidelines, which 
required the federal government to pay prevailing (i.e., union) wages in the con-
struction industry, brought the debate to a head.49 Nixon’s economic advisers 
worried about the control that the construction unions wielded to force high 
wage settlements (thereby driving up the cost of construction), which many felt 
contributed to inflation. But attacking one of the bedrocks of building trades 
union power drew open and intense criticism from George Meany of the AFL-
CIO as well as other union leaders.
When Nixon sought to recoup his image by retreating to the “heartland” to 
stage a pro-Nixon rally in Des Moines, similar to St. Louis rally a year earlier, he 
confronted an ad hoc alliance that threatened to undermine his use of cultural 
politics to shield his economic policies from criticism. “An unusual joint protest 
of hard-hat construction men, antiwar students and angry farmers” organized 
itself in response to the President’s visit, and subjected him to a barrage of boos, 
catcalls and even snowballs. The Wall Street Journal took note, reporting that “on 
recent trips around the country, Mr. Nixon has been picketed by angry groups of 
construction workers. Suspension of Davis-Bacon seemed to have undone all the 
administration’s careful cultivation of the blue collar vote.”50
The negative publicity spurred Colson to desperately reaffirm his connection 
with Brennan (who had publicly denounced the suspension of Davis-Bacon as 
“union busting” but had stopped short of personally criticizing the president).51 
Colson could not comprehend what he called the “Des Moines disaster,” prefer-
ring instead to believe his union contacts, who reassured him that “many of the 
‘hard hats’ were not, in fact, ‘hard hats’ but students posing as ‘hard hats.’ ” Regard-
less, Colson pushed officials in the Nixon administration to schedule a meeting 
with New York building trades leaders in an attempt to “avoid a demonstration” 
there.52 He also continued to work behind the scenes in an unsuccessful bid to 
have Brennan replace C. J. Haggerty as the head of the AFL-CIO Building and 
Construction Trades Council while also pushing for the president to meet directly 
with Brennan for the first time since the previous May.53 The president held off for 
a few months, but Colson justified the importance of the meeting by explaining:
Brennan has 250,000 building tradesmen under him in New York. 
He exercises tight, tough control; he can swing a large block of them 
politically as demonstrated in 1970: he strongly backed Rockefeller and 
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Buckley; even in a 3-way race Buckley got almost 50% of the blue collar 
vote in New York and heavily carried wards that Brennan “controls.” [In 
January] Brennan told me that he would do for you in New York what 
he did for Rockefeller and Buckley.54
Just as Colson was seeking to salvage his union outreach, the negotiations in 
New York City over its prospective hometown plan broke down. A plan had been 
finalized in December 1970, but had a number of weaknesses as a result of the 
unions, contractors, and politicians locking civil rights groups out of the nego-
tiations. The plan caused immediate outrage among freedom movement activ-
ists, who labeled it a fraud. Mayor Lindsay, swayed by the pressure, opposed the 
plan in January and requested that the Department of Labor not certify it. The 
New York negotiations descended into chaos as the unions refused to budge and 
the Lindsay administration blocked tens of millions of dollars of government 
construction contracts as the economy worsened.55
Art Fletcher and his staff refused to override Lindsay and certify the original 
affirmative action plan of the New York unions. OFCC Director John Wilks re-
jected the New York Plan as inadequate, citing it as a potentially bad precedent 
for other plans. Fletcher, meanwhile, decided that he needed to take action to 
salvage the entire Philadelphia Plan and hometown plan process—which meant 
not certifying any more unenforceable plans. “In the spring of 1971,” Fletcher 
recalled, “the delay [in implementing hometown plans] had become intolerable 
to me.” To boost enforcement, he oversaw a “stem-to-stern reorganization” of 
the OFCC, and increased the OFCC staff from twenty-six to ninety-six to enforce 
its hometown plans. He also expanded the scope of the Philadelphia Plan hiring 
goals to cover all projects—public or private—overseen by federal contractors. 
“I could say that we were ready, not only in the field of construction, but also 
in the rest of our area of responsibility, to become an effective law enforcement 
agency.”56
But Fletcher was dispirited to see his entire program, not just the Philadelphia 
Plan, languish. At least ten federal government agencies and departments either 
willfully ignored OFCC mandates or refused to take remedial action when they 
were found to be in violation of rules requiring federal construction contractors 
to engage in affirmative action. “We were becoming another typically inactive 
agency,” Fletcher recalled, “more concerned about our internal affairs, because 
we suffered the frustration of not being able to implement our program.”57
So, Fletcher fired off a memo to the secretary and undersecretary of labor 
in February proposing a last-ditch effort to save the Philadelphia Plan and res-
cue the OFCC from irrelevance. In it he recommended the immediate imposi-
tion (rather than negotiation) of areawide plans in Chicago, St. Louis, and San 
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Francisco to put pressure on other cities to negotiate. He also argued for the 
development of a hometown plan for Atlanta to be used as a template for other 
southern cities (none of which had adopted voluntary plans).58
When Fletcher, at a March 12, 1971, conference of minority construction con-
tractors, announced this push for a new round of imposed plans, he confirmed the 
worst fears of the building trades unions. “The era of union domination of the em-
ployment pattern in the construction industry is over,” he told the audience and 
gloated, “the unions were whipped” when “the union movement was not able to 
kill off the Philadelphia Plan.” With the attempts to get cities to voluntarily adopt 
the Philadelphia Plan struggling, Fletcher announced, “We shall impose plan after 
plan in cities where the hometown solution doesn’t work, until we move toward 
the concept of a nationwide plan. . . . And the craft unions no longer have the 
power—in Court, in Congress, or with the President—to stop such a plan.”59
News of Fletcher’s speech spread quickly, with newspapers announcing that 
a Nixon administration official had declared open war on the powerful building 
trades unions.60 Union leaders were outraged and began circulating copies of the 
speech to building trades locals throughout the country as evidence of what they 
had long claimed—that the Philadelphia Plan was a Trojan horse for union-
busting. In March and April, union leaders began openly calling for Nixon to fire 
Fletcher.61 Behind the scenes, Donald Rodgers, New York construction union 
leader and Brennan protégé, sent an urgent letter to Nixon staff demanding a 
meeting. By the end of the month, Rodgers delivered the message that the New 
York building trades unions were now calling in their favors. They wanted the 
New York Plan—which Fletcher and his staff had refused to approve—certified 
by the Department of Labor. They demanded “a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer” and wanted 
it now.62
When Fletcher then announced that new plans would be imposed in San 
Francisco, St. Louis, Chicago, Atlanta, Detroit, Buffalo, Houston, and Miami in 
time for the 1972 election, he gave Colson the pretense he needed to fire him. “I 
think I understand basic arithmetic,” Colson bitterly complained to Haldeman.
We got less than 10% of the black vote last time and I do not think 
we will get any more next time. We had close to 40% of the labor vote 
(higher among construction workers) last time and we could do better, 
except that we appear to be trying not to. . . .
I don’t want to argue the merits. I am sure that the Department and 
Mr. Fletcher are absolutely right. I am equally convinced that this is 
political dynamite especially when one recognizes that George Meany 
is a hard-hat and regards the building trades as the heart of organized 
labor. We must deal with this.63
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On May 7, 1971, Colson took his message to the president. In a phone call, 
ostensibly to prepare Nixon for a meeting later that day with Meany, Colson 
attempted to sway Nixon to rein in Fletcher. “Of course, the building trades 
need . . . some modification,” Nixon responded. “They are ingrown and so forth. 
But hell. Why fight that battle? That’s somebody else’s problem. There’s no votes 
in it for us.” With the Philadelphia Plan, Colson added, “we turn off the Ital-
ian carpenters in Pittsburgh and the Irish in New York. San Francisco, Chicago. 
Everywhere where they’re strong, and they’ve been for us. And they are for us.” 
During his meeting with Meany later in the day, Nixon promised “that this ad-
ministration is not going to be a party to anything which is detrimental to the 
building trades,” although Meany had expressed only passing interest in the issue, 
focusing his attention on foreign policy and the economy.64
Soon after Nixon’s meeting with Meany, Fletcher found his plan to redeem 
affirmative action mired in roadblocks and delays. He followed through on his 
threat and imposed an affirmative action plan on the San Francisco Bay Area; 
he also resisted pressure to certify the New York Plan. But “within the Labor 
Department,” Fletcher recalled, “bureaucratic maneuvers continued to attempt 
to restrict my authority. The pressures from unions in the construction industry 
continued to mount.”65
Colson was the key conduit of such pressure. On May 14, one week after he 
had failed to convince Ehrlichman to force Fletcher to certify the New York Plan, 
Colson sent him an almost hysterical follow-up memo. Colson demanded that 
the White House kill Fletcher’s plan to rejuvenate the Philadelphia Plan, calling 
it “the most critical political question that we face with respect to our relation-
ship with the building trades unions.” Colson, later that month, complained, “we 
are on the verge of being irreparably damaged with the ‘hard hats’ even though 
6 months ago this represented one of our most fertile fields for political gain.” 
By June, he became desperate, complaining in an “eyes only” memo to Ehrlich-
man on June 7 that White House efforts to certify the New York Plan “are being 
sabotaged.”66
Colson’s constant lobbying and his emphasis on the damage done by Fletch-
er’s attack of the icons of the new majority as racist finally won Nixon over. By 
the end of June, the question was not whether to get rid of Fletcher but how. 
In a conversation during which Colson was prepping Nixon for a meeting with 
Brennan on July 2, 1971, Colson and Nixon talked about the plan to remove 
Fletcher from the Department of Labor and put him in a powerless advisory 
committee on urban affairs. Nixon added that before Fletcher left Colson had to 
“get the New York Plan approved. Get something approved before the meeting 
[with Brennan] if you can.” Colson responded by saying, “The Fletcher news is 
probably the biggest thing we could do for them. When that happens, they’ll 
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understand it.” Nixon concluded the conversation about Fletcher’s firing by not-
ing approvingly, “that will be so we can produce something for Brennan.”67
When Brennan met with Nixon later that day for an “off the record private 
talk,” he handed Nixon a frank, one-page memo that described Nixon’s affir-
mative action program as the single largest barrier preventing craft unions and 
the Republican Party from joining forces to oppose the New Left.68 The memo, 
which the president wrote on as he read it, described the U.S. labor movement as 
“one of the strongest bulwarks against communism. . . . were it not for the Build-
ing Trades it is safe to assume that American Labor would be on the extreme 
left and highly politically oriented.” Next to Brennan’s claim that “The political 
forces on the left (both within and without the labor movement) must cripple 
the Building Trades and reduce their influence in the whole of the Labor Move-
ment in order to dominate that Labor Movement (and eventually the govern-
ment of the U.S.),” Nixon wrote “Absolutely true.” Where Brennan wrote that the 
hard hat riot had “scared hell out of the leftists,” Nixon wrote “correct,” although 
Brennan’s sentence continued: “and pointed up the need for the dismemberment 
of the Building Trades as a force in America! . . . The attack plan has been to use 
the racial issue to put the Building Trades ‘out of business.’ ” “Unfortunately,” 
Brennan wrote, “it’s working.”
The Building Trades are being persecuted, prosecuted and murdered—
and it’s all being done in the name of Richard Nixon. . . . If the picture is 
not immediately reversed, Richard Nixon inadvertently must be credited 
with crushing the Building Trades, destroying a free Labor Movement 
(economically motivated) and bringing about a politically motivated 
(European) non-American Labor Movement.69
But Brennan had no need to worry. During their conversation, Nixon ex-
plained his decision to fire Fletcher and certify the New York Plan in roundabout 
fashion, disavowing a quid pro quo and thanking Brennan for his support for 
Nixon’s foreign policy. “You fellas came to our need when frankly, the business 
community did not, the education community did not, and the great newspa-
pers did not, except for a few . . . and I am aware of that.”70
Brennan’s cultural politics—which, in the name of fighting communism at 
home and abroad, invoked economic populism to repress rather than join forces 
with the antiwar left and black freedom movement—shaped Nixon’s outreach to 
organized labor as a whole. Three weeks after meeting with Brennan, the presi-
dent and his top aides met to finally resolve the debate within the White House 
over his blue-collar strategy. Confirming where Nixon stood on the labor ques-
tion after over a year of debate and two years of going in multiple directions at 
once, the president, according to Colson’s notes, “said that the farmers and the 
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hard hats represent ‘whatever is left of the character of this country.’ . . . Regardless 
of the politics, he held it vital that we continue to recognize and work with this 
group and that we not attack unions which represent the organized structure of 
the working man.”71
The subsequent retreat from affirmative action was swift. The Department 
of Labor certified the New York Plan on August 11, 1971. In September, Fletcher 
was transferred out of the Department of Labor and became the U.S. alternative 
representative to the United Nations—a position he quit less than three months 
later, joining the exodus of high-profile black appointees from Nixon’s first-term 
administration. When Labor Secretary Hodgson nominated Lowell Perry, an auto 
industry executive from Detroit, to replace Fletcher, Colson successfully blocked 
Perry’s appointment solely because he was black. As Ehrlichman explained to 
Nixon, Colson “is just adamant . . . [that] the blacks should not be administering 
the Philadelphia Plan at least for a while until we get well with the unions.”72
 “Getting well with the unions” took far more than firing Arthur Fletcher and 
putting the kibosh on the administration’s enforcement of affirmative action, 
however. In Fall 1971, James Suffridge, head of the Retail Clerks Union and a 
Nixon supporter, advised the White House that, because of outreach blunders 
and heavy-handed economic regulations, “our relationship with labor leader-
ship has steadily deteriorated and is now at an all time low.” Colson responded 
by working clandestinely to shore up support among organized labor while em-
ploying “dirty tricks” against Democratic Party presidential candidates. Colson 
also worried that George Meany wanted the Teamsters Union to rejoin the labor 
movement. Fearing that the ability of the Teamsters to “quietly work very hard 
for us, with money and organizational support” would be compromised if it 
rejoined the AFL-CIO, Colson successfully negotiated Nixon’s pardon of former 
Teamsters President Jimmy Hoffa in December 1971.73
In spring 1972, Colson hired Donald Rodgers, who had negotiated the New 
York Plan with Brennan, to organize a Labor Committee for the Nixon reelection 
campaign. Colson hired Rodgers for his contacts with “building trades leaders in 
New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio and Illinois, the very labor constituen-
cies that we need to make our major efforts with.” But Colson also had Rodgers 
do favors for Nixon allies in the labor movement, including stifling a Department 
of Justice investigation into Jesse Calhoun’s Marine Employees union; blocking a 
Department of Labor investigation into the election of Paul Hall, Seafarer union 
president; granting exemptions to wage freezes for Gleason’s longshoremen; and 
providing assorted favors to Teamsters President Frank Fitzsimmons.74
How much Colson and Nixon knew about corruption in the unions they 
courted is unclear. When a small publication called Scanlan’s Monthly docu-
mented the criminal backgrounds of the union leaders who met with President 
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Nixon after the hard hat riot, Colson, instead of refuting the charges or cut-
ting ties with these labor leaders, teamed up with Brennan to drive Scanlan’s 
out of business. In the New York construction industry, corruption became so 
pervasive in the 1970s and 1980s that James Jacobs, a law professor, labeled the 
city building trades unions a “cosa nostra fiefdom.” State and federal govern-
ment investigations during the 1980s documented the extent of labor racketeer-
ing and mob ties—including Cosa Nostra control of some laborer union locals 
for half a century and the Genovese crime family’s effective control of the Car-
penters Union New York District Council. These facts lend credence to Larry 
Summers’s difficult-to-verify claim that the New York Building Trades Council 
“was mob-linked, and Brennan routinely carried a loaded gun and traveled with 
bodyguards.”75
But, regardless of what he knew, Nixon’s bending of the law for the conser-
vative unions raised the question of whether the labor support for Nixon was 
ultimately less about the “social issue” and more about seeking protection from 
the enforcement of the federal civil rights, labor, and racketeering laws. Playing 
hardball with the enemies of labor certainly emboldened Colson, who soon de-
veloped a public swagger as Nixon’s “hatchet-man.” So when the OFCC director 
resigned in protest over the retreat of the Department of Labor from affirmative 
action in mid-1972, Colson, rather than suppressing the story, played it up. “The 
reason this guy is quitting,” Colson told Rodgers,
is because we are suppressing his minority hiring practices program. 
We are doing this because of your goddamn Building Trades. At least if 
we are going to have the Blacks up in arms at us, we ought to be getting 
some brownie points from the Pete Brennans of this world and oth-
ers. . . . we do have the Labor Department under control and it is now 
[John] Mitchell’s job to get Justice under control. Can’t you get some-
one to write an article that Rodgers is hired, he’s here a month and the 
head of OFCC resigns?76
With inside knowledge about the labor movement and contacts with con-
servative union leaders in the building trades, Rodgers and Brennan proved in-
valuable to the Nixon campaign. Together, they helped ensure that the AFL-CIO 
Building Trades Council remained neutral in the presidential election, built a 
coalition within the AFL-CIO to do the same, and helped secure individual en-
dorsements from union locals and their leaders across the country.77
The success of Nixon’s labor strategy should not be overstated. It would have 
been impossible to ensure union neutrality in the election had the Democratic 
Party presidential nominee supported the Vietnam War. Busing proved to be 
a much more charged issue than affirmative action during the 1972 election, 
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with Dick Scammon, author of The Real Majority, secretly advising Colson to 
“exploit” the issue in “15 to 20 critical cities across the country” (which Colson 
often did by spreading false rumors to stir racial anxieties). And many white 
workers supported local Democrats while voting for Nixon in 1972. Yet Nixon’s 
labor outreach still helped mold and give voice to dissidence among Democratic 
Party stalwarts. And his victory lent credence to his strategy of building a new 
Republican Party majority through cultural rather than economic politics. As 
the president watched the results come in on election night, he toasted Colson, 
reportedly saying, “Here’s to you, Chuck. Those are your votes that are pouring 
in, the Catholics, the union members, the blue-collars, your votes, boy. It was 
your strategy and it’s a landslide!”78
Nixon’s Cultivation of Labor: 
Institutional and Cultural Legacies
Colson, exhausted by the campaign and worn down by questions regarding his 
role in the Watergate burglaries, nonetheless felt a sense of triumph. “I believe,” 
he wrote the president immediately after the election, “we are on the threshold 
of one of the most significant realignments in American political history. . . . We 
have cracked the solid foundation of the Democratic Party; its traditional base 
of labor, blue-collar, white ethnics have now become part of the Nixon Major-
ity. . . . Our challenge, it seems to me, is to convert the Nixon personal New Major-
ity into a permanent institutional majority.”79
The Department of Labor, he believed, could be a “magnificent vehicle for 
making the New Majority permanent.” But, Colson believed, its nonpartisan re-
porting of the worsening state of the economy, its employment programs for 
minorities, and its prosecution of union corruption had supposedly made it a 
“disaster.”80
Yet Nixon’s celebration of Colson was overblown and fleeting. Colson wanted 
Nixon to appoint him secretary of labor “to direct more effort into ‘our’ constitu-
ents . . . not the deadbeat minority worker who cannot be helped by any amount 
of federal money and who will never be part of the Nixon Majority.” But Nixon, 
wanting someone from the labor movement, opted instead to appoint Brennan. 
At the same time, Don Rodgers, the other major hard hat in the administration, 
stayed on in the White House as the consultant to the president for labor, draw-
ing up a plan for transforming the Labor for Nixon committee into what Colson 
hoped would become a “permanent, continuing organization.”81
From their new positions of power, the New York building trades union lead-
ers deepened the institutional foundation of the backlash against affirmative 
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action. As secretary of labor, Brennan shifted from departmental enforcement 
of fair employment executive orders to increased voluntarism and localism and 
overruled local affirmative action plans that had strict standards. He then decen-
tralized OFCC functions throughout the Department of Labor. These institu-
tional changes, and the cultural politics that Nixon used to rationalize them, had 
a lasting effect on U.S. politics despite the fact that neither Fletcher’s, Brennan’s, 
nor Colson’s visions for the future survived Nixon’s resignation and the after-
shocks of the Watergate scandal.82
Absent support from the Department of Labor, the 1970s activist cam-
paigns to the desegregate the U.S. workplace became increasingly dependent on 
(1) Title VII litigation, mediated by a court system that lacked the administra-
tive capacity to enforce wide-ranging affirmative action decrees; (2) discrimina-
tion complaints submitted to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC), a weak and underfunded federal agency whose backlog of unresolved 
cases swelled into the hundreds of thousands by the mid-1970s; and (3) the en-
forcement of local fair employment laws to desegregate the U.S. workplace on a 
piecemeal rather than industrywide basis.83
Nixon, under pressure from Haldeman and Ehrlichman (who had long re-
sented Colson’s power and who sought to make him a scapegoat for the Water-
gate burglaries), pushed Colson out of the White House after the 1972 election. 
Betrayed, Colson returned to his law firm, where he was put on retainer by the 
Teamsters before being convicted for his role in the Watergate coverup. Colson’s 
collapse mirrored the fate of his plans for a new majority. The electoral alliances 
that Nixon sought to solidify were discredited and disassembled by the Watergate 
scandal. President Gerald Ford responded by distancing himself from Nixon’s al-
lies in organized labor, and both he and Jimmy Carter purged the federal govern-
ment of tainted Nixon appointees, including Brennan. A few prominent union 
members of Democrats for Nixon had been prosecuted for corruption during 
the 1972 election, but that trickle became a flood after Nixon resigned and the 
Departments of Justice and Labor resumed their prosecution of organized crime 
in the labor movement.84
Nixon’s failure to create a new majority was still productive, however. His 
choice to adopt the union opposition to affirmative action contributed to a new 
language for U.S. politics that persisted well beyond his own political career. The 
hard hat–inspired alliance between white workers and the Nixon administration 
reframed the solidarities of whiteness around a coded rhetoric of color-blindness 
that had a national appeal. Framed as a backlash against the supposed excesses 
of Black Power and affirmative action, hard hat politics conveniently erased the 
history of the grassroots movements against open housing, school desegregation, 
fair employment, and police accountability. Framed as a working-class, white 
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ethnic phenomenon, it downplayed the role that middle- and upper-class people 
of all ethnicities played in the supposed backlash against civil rights. Although 
not leading in any simplistic way to the creation of the Reagan Democrats or 
the culture wars of the 1980s and 1990s, hard hat politics provided a language 
for expressing the trauma of economic dislocation, blaming affirmative action 
instead of neoliberalism or deindustrialization for the decline of the middle class 
in the 1970s.
Perhaps one of the most bitter ironies of this new, post–civil rights cultural 
politics was how paltry its “wages of whiteness” were, how little the conservative 
unions and their members benefited from their defection from the Democratic 
Party. Workers who felt common cause with the Republican Party on the “social 
issue” were hardly prepared for the antiunion campaigns of the 1970s and 1980s. 
In the construction industry, business leaders and politicians—while paying lip 
service to hard hats in electoral politics—pushed to replace union journeymen 
with narrowly specialized and lower-paid nonunion workers throughout the 
construction industry from the late 1960s to the early 1980s. The long, bitter 
campaigns against affirmative action drew the resources and energy of the build-
ing trades unions away from effective responses to these challenges. And, as the 
economy worsened, many construction workers further hastened the erosion of 
the power of their unions by working nonunion jobs to make ends meet. The 
building trades unions have never recovered from these defeats, nor have they 
fully reckoned with the costs they incurred as defenders of a narrow vision of 
craft unionism.85
Yet, no matter how misleading hard hat stereotypes were or how little white 
men stood to gain from them, real construction workers and their unions helped 
create the hard hat image and were partly responsible for its effects. The unions 
and their leaders were not merely the victims of stereotypes in the media or of 
Nixon’s cynical ambitions. Nixon’s embrace of the hard hats was reactive and 
profoundly shaped by union leaders’ protests and guidance. Nixon’s betrayal of 
Fletcher and retreat from the Philadelphia Plan came at the request of union 
leaders. This retreat silently facilitated the coordinated appeals of the unions and 
the Republican Party to a patriotic white working class rather than a multiracial 
working class. Similar divisive campaigns for a supposedly color-blind economic 
populism continue to pit calls for equal opportunity against affirmative action, 
and class against racial justice, while giving us neither.
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